Hi all -
ugh… dreading this post / been awaiting an astral reframing that would allow me to see things in a less confrontational manner. No such intervention has occurred.
Hopefully this is simply a case of being misinformed. I am trying to manage/limit my engagement and realize this could result in not always having all the facts.
First, this is by no means directed at the engineers or good-faith advocates of the new mechanism; we have a collective interest in moving away from the veto and I assume this is the spirit of much of the energy that has gone into the upgrade.
Instead, this is targeted at those who may be planning to vote in favor of the change and subsequently execute a Fork call for personal gain.
In case it is not self-evident, you cannot deposit $1 into a common enterprise, turn around & withdraw $20, or for that matter, $1.01 in the name of ‘arbitrage,’ or simply because the protocol allows it. This is not an acceptable or defensible practice & is exacerbated by the fact that, in this initial instance, by depositing those funds you are acquiring influence towards making such a conceit possible. This is, in my view, a civil breach of duty and possibly even fraud; (you know, a sybil attack…)
I would invite anyone planning to participate in a Fork call in the near future from which they would financially benefit to consider carefully whether they want to participate in the upgrade vote.
Its my suspicion that there are token-holders that aim to profit from forcing the DAO into a ‘book-value’ appraisal paradigm, and I’m sure some have spoken in Discord and other forums about this angle.
Hopefully I’m misreading the situation. However I felt it necessary and fair to express the concern and notice any potential attackers as well as The Foundation/Nounders and all DAO members that I expect all real and implied covenants to be honored and malicious Forks will not be allowed to execute. If the veto can’t be exercised over the Fork function I suppose that would mean I expect the upgrade itself be not allowed to proceed as the last point of defense. This seems to be the exact circumstance for which the veto was designated.
Also, the regulatory risk seems far from abated by the intermediating forking step, though in interest of time will not unpack that here (I’m aware Foundation counsel feels at least better about it).
I am currently exploring litigation strategies in the event of an objectionable/predatory outcome. I have no idea whether this is at all concerning to any participants but figured it reasonable to give a heads up; it’s also ofc possible I will not follow through with this course of action (see: track record). I also understand that it could be seen as optically problematic if the DAO appears to buckle in face of legal risks and will bear no ill will towards any members for any position they feel they have to take in the event of a dispute. Humbly, I ask for the same consideration, since, despite my recent absence, I consider many in the DAO to be great friends.
Nouns is such a beautiful project and it makes me sad to see this happen. The DAO deserves an exit mechanic that strengthens its security, regulatory, cultural fronts. This mechanism weakens each. Still, Nouns is resilient and I believe it will find a way to carry on through the loomy-gloom of book-value legitimacy.
Keep Nouns Weird