hi paji and welcome to Nouns! Couldn’t be more thrilled about the dynamism of the Japan faction 
The core idea here seems to be developing a tool which would make it easy to fork the Nouns protocol, add new art and potentially tweak governance parameters as you outline in your improvement suggestions. Is that right? Seems like an exciting and useful idea if so.
If you are suggesting we consider making the ‘improvement suggestions’ changes to Nouns itself I have a couple comments:
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1. Improvement in the speed of deciding where to use the treasury.
Currently Quorum is a fixed 10% of supply (not aware of any “20%” rule), though there are tentative plans to move to a Variable Quorum with an aim to increase consensus assurances around more disputed proposals. see: Proposal: NIP-1 Dynamic Quroum
Generally I think the idea of parametrizing the Quorum calculation (and possible the Voting Period) by Eth tx size is a good one, and we would only need to be mindful of transactions that contain other logic that could be a potential security risk (proposals that contain more complex tx would likely default to most stringent parameters until they can be safely analyzed) -
Improvement of DAO proposal submission threshold.
without upgrading the protocol the lowest possible threshold is 1BPS which would = 1 Noun for the 1st 1000 Days. This change can be submitted via a simple proposal (it has been done three times already, here is an example: Nouns DAO).The idea of fixing the proposal threshold at 1 Noun is very interesting and would probably require some discussion/thought among DAO members before receiving majority approval, though am not sure. In the meantime I think 1000 separate “validators” (setProposalThresholdBPS(1) is a great place to start! -
Setting a penalty for not participating in DAO.
Wow! I talk about penalties for non-participation sometimes but my thinking is nowhere near this bold
A possible (alternative) approach is to provide rewards in the form of Governance stipends (Eth rewards for voting & successful proposals) along with thoughtfully designed penalties for thoughtless/malicious proposals (requiring proposals to include a deposit which the DAO can keep if they find the proposal to be careless or predatory). Severely bad proposals could in some cases be grounds for “banishment” as you put it. This way participation can be strongly encouraged while avoiding an environment where members feel their investment/potential role in the dao is consistently at risk. Thoughts?
Thanks again for bringing these ideas. The growth of the Japan group has been amazing to watch. Since the proposed Dao-maker will require some technical skill to complete, can you give us a sense of who will be building and their past development (coding) experience?